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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction in this case

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1.

Did the trial court correctly determine that the Utah

State Tax Commission, not the Uintah County Assessor, assesses
and levies on oil, gas and mineral rights?
the

district

correctness.

court's

grant

of

The court reviews

summary

judgment

for

Keith v. Mountain Resorts Development 2014 UT 32

~16, 337 P.3d 213.
2.

Did the trial court correctly determine that severed

mineral rights that were not assessed or levied by the county
are not subject to the county tax sale? The court reviews the
district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness.
Keith v Mountain Resorts Development 2014 UT 32 ~16, 337 P.3d
213.
3.

Did the trial court correctly determine that due

process prevents the running of a statute of limitations on
w;)

tax titles when no notice was given to the Jordans of the
assessment, the imposition of the taxes,
the tax sale?

the delinquency or

The court reviews the district court's grant of

summary judgment for correctness.

Keith v Mountain Resorts

Development 2014 UT 32 il6, 337 P.3d 213.
4.

Did the trial court correctly rule that Utah Code
1

Ann. §40-6-1 et seq., not Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12, provides
the remedy for payment for oil and gas production if it is
determined that Jensens own the oil and gas rights?

The court

reviews the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for
correctness.

America West Bank LLC v State, 2014 UT 49 i7,

342 P.3d 224.
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 is attached as Addendum 3.
Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12 is attached as Addendum 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case:

Jordans)

Plaintiffs

(herein referred to as

are descendants of Harvey and Edna Peterson,

who

homesteaded the subject property located in Uintah County,
Utah in the early 1900s. The Jordans' predecessors eventually
sold the surface rights, retaining the oil, gas and mineral
rights.

The Jordans leased their oil, gas and mineral rights

and the third-party defendants drilled an oil and gas well on
the property. Defendants (herein referred to as Jensens) are
the present owners of the surface rights and claimed title to
the oil and gas rights thru a tax sale.
Jordans filed this lawsuit to quiet title to the oil, gas
and mineral rights.
oil,

Jensens answered, claiming title to the

gas and mineral rights based on a tax deed that was

issued from a tax sale for 1995 unpaid taxes to Uintah County,
2

Utah.

The assessment,

levy and tax sale occurred after the

oil, gas and mineral rights had been severed from the fee.
Jensens also filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint
against Third-Party Defendants,

Axia Energy LLC,

Stonegate

Resources LLC and Wasatch Oil & Gas LLC {collectively referred
to herein as Axia), which entities had interests in the oil,
gas and mineral rights based on leases and drilling of an oil
and gas well on the subject property.

Proceedings Below: Jordans filed their complaint to quiet
title on July 5, 2013.

R. 1-17.

The complaint alleged that

the oil, gas and mineral rights were not assessed, having been
severed from the surface, and, therefore, were not subject to
the

tax

sale

for

the

alleged

that

no

notice

predecessors

of

required

due

by

the

1995

tax,

process.

taxes.

was

The

complaint

to

Jordans

given

the

delinquency

Jensens

filed

or
their

further

or

the

their

sale

answer

as
and

counterclaim on August 9, 2013, seeking a declaratory judgment
to quiet title to the oil,
~

that

Jordans'

ownership

gas and mineral rights,
was

barred

by

the

alleging

statute

of

limitations, claiming to have adversely possessed the mineral
rights,

asserting conversion and trespass and averring that

Jordans had violated Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12 (wrongful removal
of ore). R. 23-42.
Jordans moved to dismiss the Jensens'
3

cause of action

based on Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12. R.

49-51. That motion was

briefed by the parties, and, after oral argument on October
29,

2013,

the

court

(Judge

Petersen)

granted the motion

finding that the Jensens' remedy was under Utah Code Ann. §416-1 et. seq. and dismissed that cause of action. R. 166-169,
R. 2009. Addendum 2.
Jensens then amended their counterclaim adding a thirdparty complaint against the Axia entities, which had leased
the

oil,

gas

and mineral

rights

from Jordans

or who

had

drilled the oil and gas well on the property. R. 170-172.
After completing discovery, all parties filed motions for
summary judgment. Oral argument was held on the motions for
summary judgment on September 24, 2014 before Judge McClellan.
At the oral argument,

the parties'

counsel agreed that the

material facts were not in dispute.

See pages 9 thru 12 of

Transcript of the September 24, 2014 hearing, R. 2010. Prior
to issuing his ruling, Judge McClellan recused himself after
a potential conflict arose.

The case was then assigned to

Judge Samuel Chiara.
Disposition

at

the

Trial

Court:

Judge

Chiara,

after

considering the memoranda submitted by the parties and the
transcript of

the

September

24,

2014

hearing,

issued his

Ruling and Order on February 18, 2015. That Ruling and Order
granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the Jordans
4

and Axia, and denied the Jensen Motion for Summary Judgment.
Addendum 1, R. 1816-1834.

FACTS
The parties stipulated that the material facts were not
disputed and that many of the facts listed by the parties in
their memoranda were not material. September 24, 2014 hearing
transcript pages 8 thru 11,
~

R.

2010.

Jensens'

statement of

facts in their brief includes many of the facts the parties
agreed were not material to the issues before the court, and
were facts not relied on by the court in entering its Ruling
and Order.
The

trial

court

found

that

the

following

facts

were

undisputed and based its ruling on these facts. Addendum 1, R.
1816-1834.
1.

The

property

that

is

the

subject

of

this

case

consists of approximately 40 acres in Randlett, Utah, legally
described as the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of
Section
~

32,

Township

7

South,

Range

20

East,

Salt

Lake

Meridian.
2.

On October 25, 1954, Olivia Jordan, Marie Robertson,

and Caroline Kelley (the "Jordans") acquired the property.
3.

The Jordans sold the property to Jonathan Anthony

Andrews, reserving the oil, gas and mineral rights. The deed
is dated February 3,

1995,

and recorded March 15,
5

1995, at

Book 592, Page 95, in the Uintah County Recorder's Office.
4.

The real property tax notice for the 1995 taxes on

the property was mailed by Uintah County to Olivia Jordan c/o
Jonathan Anthony Andrews, P.O. Box 5451, Gainesville, Fl.
5.

The 1995 taxes were not timely paid.

6.

The 1996 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony

Andrews, at P.O. Box 851981, Richardson, Texas.

Those taxes

in the amount of $32.42 were paid on November 21, 1996.
7.

The 1997 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony

Andrews at the Richardson, Texas address. The 1997 taxes in
the amount of $35.92 were paid on December 10, 1997.
8.

On November 17,

1997, $33.05 was paid on the 1995

taxes. After payment on penalties and interest, there was a
balance owing of $8.94.
9.

The 1998 and 1999 tax notices were sent to Jonathan

Anthony Andrews at the Richardson, Texas P.O. Box. The taxes
for 1998 and 1999 were not paid.
10.

For failing to pay the real property taxes assessed

for the 1995, 1998, and 1999 tax years,
due

amount of $167 .19,

resulting in a past

Uintah County seized and sold the

property on May 25, 2000.
11.

The

record

of

delinquent

taxes

prepared

by

the

treasurer and recorder states that the date of the tax lien is
January 16, 1996, and date of delinquency is January 16, 1996.
6

All parties agree this date is incorrect, and likely due
to a typographical error. The taxes for the 1996 year were
paid. The record should have indicated a tax lien date and
delinquency date of

January 1,

balance

1995

due

on

the

1995,

taxes.

as

{This

there
is

a

remained a
footnote

to

paragraph 11 in the court's Ruling and Order.)
12.

The assessment and levy for the 1995 tax year did not

occur until on or after May 12, 1995.
13.

No

notice

was

ever

given

to

the

Jordans

of

the

assessment of 1995, the failure to pay the taxes, or the tax
sale.
14.

On May 25,

2000, Uintah County executed a tax deed

concerning the property. The grantee was Quality Remediation
Services ("QRS"), which paid the County $6,000.00.
15.

On December 13, 2000, QRS executed a warranty deed

concerning the property. The Jensens were the grantees, and
paid $5,500.00 to QRS.
16.
~

In

a

January

2001

Real

Property Transfer

Survey

Standard Land Questionnaire, the Jensens indicated they paid
fair market value for the property, and that the sale did not
include the mineral rights.
17.

Prior to March 2013,

the Jensens never asserted a

claim to own the mineral rights in the property.
18.

Since 1995, the Jordans have periodically leased the
7

oil, gas and mineral rights.
19.

In May 2011,

Stonegate entered into oil

and gas

leases with the successors in interest to the Jordans.
August of 2011,
these

leases

In

Stonegate assigned the working interest in

to Axia,

reserving

for

itself and Wasatch a

royalty interest.
20.

In November 2011, the Jensens entered into a Surface

Use Agreement and Grant of Easements, allowing Axia to conduct
exploration and drilling operations on the property.
21.

Over time, Axia has paid the Jensens $21,182.00 under

the Surface Use Agreement.
22.

Axia paid all the taxes associated with the mineral

rights in 2012 and 2013, totaling $84,878.32.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The assessing,

levying and taxing of oil,

gas and

mineral rights are the responsibility of the Utah State Tax
Commission.

Therefore,

the Jordans'

oil,

gas and mineral

rights were not subject to the tax lien or the tax sale by
Uintah County, Utah.
2.

The Uintah County Assessor knew that she was not

responsible to assess and levy on oil, gas and mineral rights,
especially when they have been severed from the fee.

It is

undisputed that the Uintah County Assessor did not assess the
Jordans' oil, gas and mineral rights. The law in Utah has long
8

held that property interests that are not assessed and levied
are not subject to the tax lien or the tax sale.
3.

The United States Supreme Court, beginning with the

case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306

(1950),

has held that,

if due process requirements of

notice are not afforded to the property owner, then the tax
sale is void and state statutes of limitation do not bar a
subsequent challenge to the tax sale.
4.

Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 provides the remedies for the

Jensens, if it is determined that they were not paid for oil
and gas production in which they owned an interest,
than Utah Code Ann.

rather

§40-1-12 regarding wrongful removal of

ore.
ARGUMENT

I.
The Utah State Tax Commission not County Assessors
Assess and Levy on Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights.
Jensens first argue that the Uintah County Assessor had
a constitutional and statutory duty to assess all oil, gas and
mineral rights in the county, even those with no value, those
not discovered and those severed from the surface estate. Then
Jensens argue that,

even though it is undisputed that the

Uintah County Assessor did not assess the Jordans'

severed

oil, gas and mineral rights, those oil, gas and mineral rights
were still subject to the county tax sale.
The first

flaw in Jensens'
9

argument

is that the Utah

State Tax Commission assesses oil, gas and mineral rights, not
the County Assessors. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-201(1) (a) (v) and
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v Robbins 116 Utah 314, 209 P.2d 739
(Utah 1949). The Uintah County Assessor was fully aware of her
duties when she did not assess the severed oil,

gas and

mineral rights or any other oil, gas and mineral rights in
1995. R.239-244.
To adopt the Jensens' argument would require this Court
to ignore the Constitution of Utah and the statutes regarding
taxation of minerals.

It would also require the Court to

develop a methodology of how to value unknown minerals, and
would change the historical valuation and taxing of oil and
gas reserves. Such a change would also impact (1) assessors
who would then be required to locate all owners of severed
mineral rights,

(2) owners of severed mineral rights alleged

to have been sold at tax sale due to the sale of the surface
property, (3) owners of mineral rights who apparently would be
owing years of unpaid taxes, and (4) those who have developed
mineral rights,

as that will place a cloud on all severed

mineral rights.
Jordans,

pursuant to Rule 24 ( i)

of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, further adopt the arguments on this issue
by amicus, The Utah State Tax Commission, the Utah Farm Bureau
et. al. and by Appellee Axia.
10

II. The Severed Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights in This Case
Were Not Assessed Nor Levied by the Uintah County Assessor.
Therefore, the Severed Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights in This
Case Were Not Subject to the Tax Lien.

In the event this Court determines that the Uintah County
Assessor had the

duty

to

assess

and levy on the mineral

rights,

Jensens' argument that even though the oil, gas and

mineral

rights were

severed from the

fee

estate,

and not

assessed or levied on by the Uintah County Assessor, they were
still subject to the tax lien for the taxes for 1995 thru
1999, is counter to decades of Utah law.

Utah law is clear

that before there is a lien to attach and relate back,
property must first be assessed and levied.
Dale 75 P. 932, 934

the

See Gillmor v

(Utah 1904) and Tintic Undine Mining Co.

v. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Utah 1938).
In Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (Utah 1946), the
Court held that
If property rights which are not included in an
assessment are sold or extinguished by a tax sale,
there would be a taking of property without due
process of law.
~

Id. at 786. See also H.C. Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10,
110, 152 P.3d 312 {Utah 2007)

("Assessment is the basis of the

tax title and only that interest which was properly assessed
can be sold."); West Valley City Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 852
P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah 1993) {"The date of assessment and levy,
not the statutory lien date of January 1st, is the relevant
11

date for determining whether property is within the reach of
a taxing entity's power for the purpose of assessing, levying
and collecting taxes on the property.").
Jensens,

in

an attempt

to

distinguish

the

factually

similar case of Huntington City v. Peterson, 30 Utah 2d. 408,
518 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974), claim that the holding applies only
to tax exempt municipal corporations. A reading of that case
shows that was not the basis for the holding in the case, but
rather was the position of the dissent. The holding was stated
as

follows:

"[T]he

respondent

has

not

shown

that

the

assessment and levy of the tax for the year 1959 were made
prior to the time when the city acquired its title." Id. at
412. Cases not involving government entities have reached the
same conclusion.
In Mason v. Loveless, 2001 Ut. App. 145, 24 P.3d 997, the
court held that a boundary by acquiescence claim was not
extinguished by a tax sale, because the holder of the claim
was not assessed, and because it would violate due process of
law. Id. at~~ 15 and 16. In Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169
P.2d 781 (Utah 1946), the court held that a tax sale does not
remove easements, building restrictions, or other equitable
covenants. There, the court stated, "If the person assessed as
owner had no title to the easement, certainly the tax sale
could not pass title thereto; the property assessed and the
12

property conveyed must be the same." Id. at 786.

See also

Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack et al., 93 Utah 561, 74
P.2d 1184 (Utah 1938).
Jensens' reliance on Sawey v. Barr, 52 N.M. 358, 198 P.2d
801

(N.M. 1948),

is misplaced. The holding in that case was

based on the failure to record the deed, so that the assessor
was aware that the minerals had been severed. The law in New
Mexico is that the mineral estate is assessed separately. See
Kaye v. Cooper Grocery Co.,
1957).

See also Lien v.

63 N.M.

Simon,

36,

522 F.

312 P.2d 798
Supp.

712

(N.M.

(D. Mont.

1981) .
III.
Jensen's Statute of Limitations Argument Fails
Because the Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights Were Never Part of the
Tax Sale. Even if the Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights Were Subject
to the Tax Sale, the Tax Deed is Void as a Violation of Due
Process.

1.
Due Process Reguires that Jordans Receive Notice of
the Tax Sale.
The trial court found that lack of any notice to Jordans
of the taxes or of the sale violated due process and did not
prevent the Jordans from challenging the tax title. Addendum
1 pages 11-14, R. 1826 - 1829. The trial court relied on Jones
v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) and footnote 14 of Frederiksen
v.

LaFleur,

632

P.2d 827

(Utah 1981),

where

Justice Oaks

stated, "We expressly reserve opinion on whether the special
statute of limitations could protect a tax title acquired by
means repugnant to fundamental fairness or whether such an
13

application

of

the

statute

would

exceed

the

limits

of

statutory intent or constitutional permissibility."
Jensens, while conceding that Jordans received no notice
and had a

"slam dunk"

due process violation,

continue

to

assert that the Jordans cannot challenge the Jensens' title
since 4 years had passed since the sale in 2000. Essentially,
Jensens argue that the state statute of limitations trumps
constitutional rights.

The United States Supreme Court has

rejected that argument.
First, it should be noted that if this Court agrees that
the minerals were not sold at the tax sale, then this argument
is moot as the Jordans make no claim to the surface. In the
event the court finds that the mineral rights were subject to
the tax sale, that sale was void for violating due process and
the statute of limitations does not run against a void sale.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected Jensens'
argument, that statutes of limitation trump due process, on
several occasions.

In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust

Co.,

(1950),

339 U.S.

action

could

306

affect

Process

Clause

notice

be

of

given

one's

the

the Court ruled that before any
interest

in

property,

Fourteenth Amendment

"reasonably

calculated,

the

Due

required

that

under

the

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
14

objections.n
Then,
(1962),

Id. at 314.

in Schroeder v City of New York,

371 U.S.

208

the City of New York condemned and diverted water

rights that impacted property owned by Schroeder. Notice of
the condemnation was given by posting and publication. Actual
notice was not given to Schroeder. The statute provided that
any action to seek damages was barred by a three year statute
of limitations. Schroeder did not file her claim for damages
until after three years had passed. The City of New York, like
the Jensens, claimed that Schroeder's action was barred by the
three year statute of limitations, even if she did not receive
notice. The United States Supreme Court disagreed,

finding

that the notice was insufficient under Mullane and reversed
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals that held that
the claim was barred. Id. at 214.
Following Schroeder, the court again addressed this issue
in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
In Mennonite, the county posted notice of the tax sale and
~

published it for three weeks. After the tax sale, an owner,
occupant or lienholder had a two year period to redeem. If the
property was not redeemed, then the purchaser, at the sale,
received fee simple absolute title. Adams purchased at the
sale and waited the two years. Adams then filed suit to quiet
title, claiming, like the Jensens, that he owned the property.
15

The Indiana courts found for Adams.

On appeal,

the United

States Supreme Court again held that the notice did not meet
constitutional requirements and that the two year statute of
limitations did not bar the claim, and reversed the decision
of the Indiana courts.
Jones v. Flowers followed in 2006, again ruling that the
State may not take property and sell

it

for unpaid taxes

without giving the owner notice and opportunity for a hearing.
The decision of the Arkansas court upholding the sale was
reversed.
In

support

of

their position,

Jens ens

cite

Terry v.

Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877) and Saranac Land and Timber Co.
v. Comptroller of New York,
those

cases

supports

the

177 U.S. 318 (1900). Neither of
Jensens'

argument.

Those

cases

involved the question of reasonableness of the limitation time
period.

Neither involved facts where there was no notice.

Jensens also rely on Swanson v.

Pontralo,

N.W.2d

decided

Hanover

21

(1947).

Bank and

Swanson
its

was

progeny were

238 Iowa 693,

before

decided,

Mullane

and

does

27
v.
not

discuss lack of notice and due process impacts on the validity
of the tax deed. The case does point out that jurisdictional
defects would be unconstitutional and the deed void. The Iowa
Courts have since held that, without notice, the deed is void
and not subject to the running of the statute of limitations.
16
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Larsen v. Cady, 274 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Iowa 1979) and Robinson
v. First American Title Ins., 755 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa App. 2008).
See also Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478, 485-486 (1988).
The Mullane case and the cases following Mullane show
that due process is not trumped by statutes of limitation. It
is conceded by Jensens that Jordans were not given notice, and
that the due process rights were not followed. Therefore, the
statute of limitations relied on by Jensens does not bar the
Jordan's rights to contest the tax deed.
2.
Jensens' Analysis
Voidable is Incorrect.

of Whether

a

Deed

is

Void or

The test for whether documents, such as deeds, are void
or voidable "is whether they offend public policy." Bangerter
v. Petty, 2010 UT App 49, ilO, 228 P.3d 1250, citing Ockey v.
Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51 (Utah 2008). Failure to give
notice

renders

Livingston

the

document

Financial,

LLC,

void.

2015

UT

See
9,

e.g.
'1!26,

Migliore
347

P.3d

v.
394

(judgment void when no notice given). The Mullane, Schroeder,
Mennonite,

and Jones

cases hold that

the

failure

to give

notice offends the public policy set forth in the Constitution
of the United States, and that the documents involved in those
case were void. Surely, those cases were not remanded to have
the lower courts say,

"Oh well,

it was an irregularity and

therefore only voidable." Those cases were remanded to set
17

aside the unconstitutional act, regardless of passage of any
statute of limitations. See Luser v. Bank of Chelsea, 730 P.2d
506 (OK 1986), holding that under Mullane and Mennonite notice
was a jurisdictional requirement, Id. at i13; that notice in
that case was insufficient, Id. at i18; and therefore, the tax
resale deed was void, Id. at i19.
Jensens' reliance on Lake Canal Reservoir v. Beethe, 227
P.3d 882 (Colo. 2010) is also misplaced. Colorado, in a case
factually similar to this case, has ruled that, when mineral
rights are severed, those mineral rights must be separately
assessed to be taxed. Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267,
274,

243 P.2d 412

(1952). See also Webermeier v.

Pace,

37

Colo. App. 546, 552 P.2d 1021 (Colo. App. 1976). The failure
to assess the mineral rights results in the treasurer not
having jurisdiction to tax the mineral rights and the deed is
void.

Mitchell at 276.

See also Lake Canal Reservoir at 889

(holding that a tax deed is void if the taxing authority
lacked authority or jurisdiction to issue the deed); Kaye v.
Cooper Grocery Co.,

63 N.M.

36,

312 P.2d 798

(N.M.

1957)

(holding that public policy requires that severed minerals are
assessed separate from the fee). In the case before the Court,
the

deed

is

void

and

not

subject

to

the

statute

of

limitations.
3. The Recording of the Tax Deed Did Not Give Jordans'
Constitutionally Reguired Notice.
18

Q

Jensens, while conceding that the Jordans did not receive
due process notice as required by the Mullane line of cases,
still argue that since the tax deed was recorded the Jordans
had constructive notice of the tax sale and that met the due
process requirements.

This argument has been rejected by the

United States Supreme Court. Mennonite Board of Missions v
Adams 462 U.S. 791

(1983)

holding that constructive notice

provided by the documents in the public record and publication
must be supplemented by mailed notice or personal service.
Id. 798. See Also
that

publication

Jones v Flowers 547 U.S. 220 (2006) holding
and

a

mailing

that

was

returned

was

insufficient that notice must be "reasonably calculated to
reach the intended recipient.

Id. 226.

To adopt the Jensens' argument would require every land
owner to periodically go to the county recorders office of
each county where they owned an interest in land and conduct
a title check to see if anything adverse had been filed.

That

is not the purpose or requirement of the recording statute.
~

The purpose of the recording statute is to protect a buyer of
real property by giving them the opportunity to check the
status of title before they purchase real property and to be
able to rely on what is recorded. Pioneer Builders Co. of Nev.
v KDA Corp. 2012 UT 74, ~77, 292 P.3d 672.
Jensens do not point out that Jordans' title was recorded
19

years

before

Jensens

acquired

their

claim

to

title

and

therefore it is Jensens who were on notice of Jordans' title.
Jensens, when they purchased the property from QRS, should
have followed common practice of title companies and checked
the status of the title at the recorder's office.

They would

have then determined that the mineral rights had been severed.
The two cases relied on by Jensens, Kemmerer v Brigham Young
Univ. 723 F.2d 54
(Utah 1992),

(1983)

and Shelledy v Lore 836 P.2d 786

also involved parties that had purchased the

property after the tax sale and therefore like the Jensens had
notice of the sale.
IV.
Utah Code Ann. 40-6-1 et seq. Governs Oil and Gas
Production and Payment for that Production.

Jensens' complaint alleged that Jordans entered into Oil
and Gas Leases with EnCana Oil

&

Gas and received bonus

payments when signing the leases, and that Jordans permitted
EnCana's successors (Third-Party Defendants) to drill an oil
and gas well and then extract and sell oil and gas from the
property. R. 23. Jensens further alleged that Jordans' leasing
and the drilling of the oil and gas well, and the extracting
of oil and gas, violated Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12

(wrongful

removal of ores), and that Jensens were entitled to treble
damages. R. 23.
The trial court (Judge Peterson) dismissed that claim,
finding that Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1 et seq., as it related to
20

oil and gas production,

specifically addressed payment and

remedies for oil and gas production and therefore, §40-6-1 et
seq. provided the Jensens their remedy, if any, not §40-1-12.
The trial court held "that Chapter 1 has no applicability
since the passage of Chapter 6 to oil and gas." R.

2009

Transcript of 10-29-2013 hearing page 18, and R.166, Addendum
2.

The statute, Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1 et seq., governing
oil and gas drilling, was established in 1955 and then was
amended in 1983.

That legislation established the Board and

Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. The legislature declared that
it was in the pubic interest to foster, encourage and promote
the development and production of oil and gas in the State of
Utah. Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1. See also Bennion v. Utah State
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1983)
and Cowling v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 2245 {Utah 1991). That statute provides for the establishment of
drilling units, pooling of interests and payment of royalties
~

and costs to non-consenting oil and gas owners. Utah Code Ann.
§§40-6-6 and 40-6-6.5. Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 {Addendum 3)
supplies remedies for oil and gas owners who are not paid for
production

of

Resources

Inc.,

oil
849

and

gas.

See

P.2d 569

e.g.

Bennion

(Utah 1993).

v.

Graham

Those remedies

include the right to receive monthly royalty payments, to hold
21

in an interest bearing escrow account disputed payments (as in
this case) ,
hearings,
trial

penal ties and accountings.

court

governed

to have the board investigate and hold agency

by

correctly decided
those

provisions,

that
not

See Addendum 3.
Jensens'
the

remedies

statute

The
are

regarding

wrongful removal of ore.
The rules of statutory construction also show that Utah
Code Ann. §40-6-9 regarding payment of oil and gas proceeds
applies in this case rather then the ore statute.
general

principle

of

statutory

construction

that

It is a
if

two

statutes may apply to an issue that the more specific statute
applies. R.P. v. K.S.W., 2014 UT App 38, fn.9, 320 P.3d 1084,
Flowell Electric Association Inc. v. Rhodes Pump LLC, 2015 UT
87, 110,

P.3d

. In this case, Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9

specifically applies to the question of what remedy Jensens
have for unpaid royalties, if it is determined that they own
an interest in the oil and gas rights which are the subject of
this case.
Finally, the term ore does not include oil and gas. The
plain meaning of the statute must be considered. Archuleta v.
St. Marks Hosp., 2009 UT 36, ~8, 238 P.3d 1044. The dictionary
definition of ore

is

a

compound of metal

and

some

other

substance. Sukut Construction Inc. v. Rimrock CA LLC, 199 Cal.
App. 817, 825 (2011)

(citing Webster's Dictionary). Further,
22

the context of the statute is instructive. Utah Code Ann. §401-12 is included in the Mining Claims statute. Black's Law
Dictionary (1968)
land,

defines "mining claim" as "[a] parcel of

containing precious metal in its soil or rock,

and

appropriated by an individual, according to established rules
. . . . " Utah Code Ann. §40-1-1 specifically addresses "lode
mining claim[s]", setting forth metes and bounds requirements
"along

the

vein

or

lode,"

which

requirements

have

no

applicability to the recovery of oil and gas which is located
in pools often many thousands of feet below the surface and
may be located in various sections thus creating the need for
drilling units and pooling.

Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12 has no

application to the drilling for and extraction of oil and gas
which is governed by Chapter 6. Again, Chapter 6 provides the
remedies available for Jensens in the event it were determined
that they own the oil and gas rights.
CONCLUS:ION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellees Jordans respectfully
~

request that the Court affirm the trial court's decision as to
all issues before the Court on appeal.
DATED t h i s - ¼ day of January, 2016.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING AND ORDER .

James Harvey Jordan, Trustee of the James H.
Jordan Revocable Trust dated June 1, 2007,
Martha Jordan Boright, Mary Edna Jordan,
Michael C. Kelley, and Jary Anne Kelley,
Trustee of the Kelley Joint Trust dated
January 7, 2013, Gary B. Kelley, Norma
Stroud Dickey, Mara Beth Hamer, Jan
Rhodes as Trustee of the Revocable Rhodes
Family Living Trust dated April 19, 2005,
Wendy Sue Pack, Craig McSorley, Deborah J.
Bowers, Laura Ward, Mark McSorely,

Case No. 130800084
Judge SAMUEL P. CHIARA

Plaintiffs/Counterclaim
Defendants,

vs.
Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi Jensen,
Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.
Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi Jensen,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

Axia Energy, LLC, Stonegate Resources,
LCC, Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for

1

•

•

Summary Judgment; the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs/Third-Party Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment; and the Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court heard oral argument on the Motions on September 24, 2014. The Court has
thoroughly reviewed the arguments of counsel, the Motions, the supplemental pleadings, and the
relevant case law and statutes. This Ruling and Order will resolve all three of the pending
Motions for Summary Judgment.
Initially, the Court recognizes the passage of time in issuing this Ruling and Order.
Unfortunately, the necessary recusal of Judge Peterson, followed much later by the recusal of
Judge McClellan, as well as the difficulty of the issues, resulted in a longer delay than is typical.
The Court thanks the parties and counsel for their patience. The Court would also like to
recognize the exceptional quality of each party's arguments and written briefs. The level of
professionalism all sides displayed was outstanding. The quality of the legal work is very high.
The arguments are well reasoned and thorough, which made the decision difficult, but also left
the Court confident the parties have accurately presented the full scope of the law dealing with
these issues.

Undisputed Material Facts
1.

The property that is the subject of this case consists of approximately 40 acres in
Randlett, Utah, legally described as the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of
Section 32, Township 7 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake Meridian.

2.

On October 25, 1954, Olivia Jordan, Marie Robertson, and Caroline Kelley (the
"Jordans'') acquired the property.

3.

The Jordans sold the property to Jonathan Anthony Andrews, reserving the oil, gas, and
2
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•

mineral rights.' The deed is dated February 3, 1995, and recorded March 15, 1995, at
Book 592, Page 95, in the Uintah County Recorder's Office.
4.

The real property tax notice for the 1995 taxes on the property was mailed by Uintah
County to Olivia Jordan c/o Jonathan Anthony Andrews, P.O. Box 5451, Gainsville, Fl.
32602.

S.

The 199S taxes were not timely paid.

6.

The 1996 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony Andrews, at P.O. Box 851981,
Richardson, Texas. Those taxes in the amount of $32.42 were paid on November 21,
1996.

7.

The 1997 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony Andrews at the Richardson, Texas
address. The 1997 taxes in the amount of$3S.92 were paid on December 10, 1997.

8.

On November 17, 1997, $33.05 was paid on the 1995 taxes. After payment on penalties

and interest, there was a balance owing of $8.94.
9.

The 1998 and 1999 tax notices were sent to Johnathan Anthony Andrews at the
Richardson, Texas P.O. Box. The taxes for 1998 and 1999 were not paid.

10.

For failing to pay the real property taxes assessed for the 1995, 1998, and 1999 tax years,
resulting in a past due amount of $167 .19, Uintah County seized and sold the property on
May 25, 2000.

11.

The record of delinquent taxes prepared by the treasurer and recorded states that the date
of the tax lien is January 16, 19961, and date of delinquency is January 16, 1996.
1

All parties agree this date is incorrect, and likely due to a typographical error. The taxes
for the 1996 year were paid. The record should have indicated a tax lien date and delinquency
date of January 1, 1995, as there remained a balance due on the 1995 taxes.
3
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12. · The assessment and levy for the 1995 tax year did not occur until on or after May 12,
199S.
13.

No notice was ever given to the Jordans of the assessment of 199S, the failure to pay the
taxes, or the tax sale.

14.

On May 25, 2000, Uintah County executed a tax deed concerning the property. The
grantee was Quality Remediation Services ("QRS"), who paid the County $6,000.00.
G

IS.

On December 13, 2000, QRS executed a warranty deed concerning the property. The
Jensens were the grantees, and paid $5,500.00 to QRS.

16.

In a January 2001 Real Property Transfer Survey Standard Land Questionnaire the
Jensens indicated they paid fair market value for the property, and that the sale did not
include the mineral rights.

17.

Prior to March 2013, the Jensens never asserted a claim to own the ·mineral rights in the
property.

18.

Since 1995, the Jordans have periodically leased the oil, gas, and mineral rights.

19.

In May 2011, Stonegate entered into oil and gas leases with the successors in interest to
the Jordans. In August of 2011, Stonegate assigned the working interest in these leases to
Axia, reserving for itself and Wasatch a royalty interest.

20.

In November 2011, the Jensens entered into a Surface Use Agreement and Grant of
Easements, allowing Axia to conduct exploration and drilling operations on the property.

21.

Over time, Axia has paid the Jensens $21,182 under the Swface Use Agreement.

22.

Axia paid all the taxes associated with the mineral rights in 2012 and 2013, totaling
$84,878.32.
4
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Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v.
Carbon County, 80S P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts and
evidence are viewed in a light most favorable to the· nonmoving party. America Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Schettler, 768 P.2d 950,957 (Utah App. 1989).
The Motions concern competing claims to title of the oil, gas, and mineral estate. There
is no dispute of material fact. Therefore, the issue can be determined as a matter of law.

I. Whether Uintah County's t 995 general assessment included trucing the mineral interest?
The first issue is whether the Jordans' oil, gas, and mineral rights were severed from the
surface estate and not assessed or levied on by Uintah County in 199S.
The Jordans2 argue that the mineral estate was reserved at the time of conveyance of the
surface rights to Mr. Andrews on February 3, 1995. The Uintah County Assesso~ assessed the
property on May 22, 199S. Consequently, the Jordans argue that the County Assessor did not
assess the mineral rights because the mineral estate had been severed by that time. Because the
~

County Assessor did not assess the mineral rights, the Jordans argue there was no levy.
The Jensens argue that pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-103 the 1995 tax assessment
occurred on January 1, 1995, before the February 3, 199S, severance. The Jensens argue that the

2

The Jordans and Axia argue for the same result, and largely offer the same arguments
and cite to the same case law in their separate Motions and separate replies. For clarity and
brevity, the Court will refer to the Jordans when discussing both the Jordans' and Axia's
arguments and positions.

5

•
lien for the 199S unpaid taxes attached as of January 1, 1995. As a consequence, the Jensens
argue that the mineral rights were levied and properly passed by tax deed at the 2000 tax sale.
"Tax sale proceedings are predicated and founded upon failure to pay a tax assessed
against the property, and, therefore, no validity can attach to any sale except of the property
assessed and delinquent for failure to pay the tax levied on the assessment as made." Tintle

Undlne Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 14 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Utah 1938). "If property rights which
are not included in an assessment are sold or extinguishable by a tax sale, there would be a taking
of property without due process of law." Hayesv. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1946). If
Uintah County did not assess the mineral estate, the mineral estate was not subject to the tax lien
and could not pass at a tax sale. Therefore, the date of assessment, and whether Uintah County
had the power to assess the mineral estate, are critical.
Utah Code Ann. § S9-2-103(a) states: "All tangible taxable property ... shall be assessed
and weed at a uniform rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless
otherwise provided by law." Also, "[a] tax upon real property is a lien against the property
assessed ... [and] shall attach on January 1 of each year." Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-1325.
Notwithstanding, the issue of when the date of assessment and levy occurs has been
authoritatively decided in Utah. In Huntington City v. Peterson, S18 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974),
Huntington City bought a parcel ofland on April 7, 1959. The Emery County assessor assessed
the parcel of land, and the levy for tax was made in August 1959. No notice of the tax
assessment was given to Huntington City. The party assessed the 1959 taxes did not pay the
taxes and the property was sold at a tax sale. The Utah Supreme Court quieted title to
Huntington City, holding that the assessment occurred after Huntington City acquired the
6

•
property and that no tax lien attached as a consequence.
In Gillmor v. Dale, 1S P.932 (Utah 1904), the Utah Supreme Court held that a property
tax "does not become a lien on real estate until the rate thereof is fixed, and the tax levied .•."
because "[t]he city council was not authorized ... to levy a tax, except on property within its
corporate limits, and any levy upon property not within such limits is without authority and
void." Id. at 934.
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of West Valley City Corp. v. Salt Lake
City, 8S2 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah 1993 ), found:

The date of assessment and levy, not the statutory lien date of January 1st, is the
relevant date for determining whether property is within the reach of a taxing entity's
power for the purpose of assessing, levying and collecting taxes on the property.

See also H.C. Massey v. Griffiths, 1S3 P.3d 312,110 (Utah 2007)("Assessment is the basis of the
tax title and only that interest which was properly assessed can be sold.")
The Jensens contend that Utah Code Ann.§§ 59-2-1325 and 59-2-103 dictate the lien
date as January 1, of the year the property was assessed. The Jensens also attempt to distinguish
the above line of cases by arguing that those cases merely apply to property transferred to a tax
exempt entity. The Jensens argue the reason for treating a tax exempt entity differently is a tax
exempt entity would have no reason to believe that they would be taxed. Therefore, selling a tax
exempt entity's property for failure to pay truces would be improper.
The Jensens• argument that a tax lien attaches on January 1, regardless of the date of
assessment and levy, is not without support. The dissenting opinion in Huntington, 518 P.2d at
1249-50 (Henriod, J., dissenting), also insisted that a tax lien attaches on January 1 pursuant to
statute. While the dissenting opinion is well reasoned, the majority rejected it. This Court is
7
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required to follow binding precedent, which is the majority opinion.
Further, if the above line of cases only apply to tax exempt entities, that qualification was
not stated explicitly in the holdings, and the reasoning to treat tax exempt entities differently in
these scenarios was not explained. If the reason is, as the Jensens suggest, that tax exempt
entities would have no reason to suspect tax liability, the same reasoning would apply to the facts
here. The Jordans also had no reason to suspect a tax liability to the County because: (1) their
mineral interest was severed prior to taxation; (2) the mineral interest was non-productive; (3)
counties are not empowered to tax a severed mineral interest under the Constitution and the Act;
(4) Uintah County did not believe that they assessed these mineral interests in 1995; (S) the

Jordans had never had their mineral estate assessed separately prior to 1995;and (6) the Uintah
County Record of Delinquent Taxes showed the wrong lien date for the property. Based on these
factors, the Jordans would have had no reason to believe that their mineral interest was taxed by
Uintah County for the 199S year.
Because the property was not assessed by the Uintah County assessor until after the
February 3, 1995, severance date, the mineral estate was not assessed by the County. Uintah
County only assessed the surface rights. The tax lien did not attach to the mineral rights.
Consequently, authority and jurisdiction to sell the mineral rights were not acquired by the
County, and the mineral interests were not sold at the May 2000 tax sale.

II. Whether Uintah County had the authority to assess the severed mineral interest?
The Jordans argue Uintah County does not have the authority to separately assess, levy,
and seize mineral rights. The Jordans point to Utah Code Ann.§§ 59-2-201 and S9-5-102, et
8
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seq., which directs that counties tax the surface interest, and the Utah State Tax Commission
taxes the mineral interest. The Jordans also cite to case law which hold the same. See Telonis v.

Staley, 144 P.2d 513, 515 (Utah 1943)("Where there is separate ownership of the respective
rights [refening to severed surface and mineral rights], separate levy and separate sale would
necessarily follow...."); Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon County, 535 P.2d
1139, 1140 (Utah 1975)(holding Utah State Tax Commission taxes mineral rights and counties
tax surface rights).

The Jensens argue Uintah County was required to tax the mineral interests as part of the
general assessment. The Jensens argue that "all tangible property in the State that is not exempt .
. . shall be" assessed and taxed. Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2. Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 59-2-301, counties are required to assess all property not assessed by the Utah State
Tax Commission. The Jensens argue the Commission is obligated to assess only valuable
mineral deposits. The Jensens argue that the mineral estate was not valuable until 2012 when the
mine started producing. Therefore, the Jensens argue Uintah County was required to assess the
mineral estate in 1995 when it was not valuable, or at least, had not had a value applied to it.
Admittedly, this is a difficult issue. On one hand, if it is true that the Commission is only
required to tax producing or valuable mineral interests, and counties are only authorized to tax
surface rights, then there is seemingly a gap left that allows unproductive mineral interests to go
untaxed. Although those unproductive mineral interests are not producing, in many instances
they perhaps have some undetennined value. On the other hand, if counties are required to tax
non-producing mineral interests, the practical problem of detennining the value of an
wiproductive mineral interest arises. Additionally, Uintah County does not attempt to determine
9
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a value or apply a tax rate to severed mineral interests. Neither does Uintah County send
separate tax bills, notices, or notices of sales to owners of severed mineral interests. Following
Jensen,s reasoning, severed unproductive mineral interests have unknowingly passed at
numerous tax sales. Because Uintah County does not notify owners of severed mineral interests
of assessments or tax sales, it is likely that many owners of severed mineral interests find
themselves in an identical position to the Jordans. Finally, where surface and mineral interests
have been severed, such as is likely the case with hundreds or even thousands of parcels in
Uintah County, the county,s general assessment results in only one tax·bill even though there are
at least two owners. That tax bill is uniformly assessed to and paid by the surface owner. Would
mineral interest owners be liable to pay some portion of the tax where the mineral interest is
nonproductive and not otherwise taxed? How would the property owners divide the bill? What
would happen if one party paid the full amount of the bill?
The Court detennines that undeveloped or undiscovered minerals underlying a piece of
property are akin to an intangible asset. As an intangible asset, the undiscovered minerals fall
outside the scope of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution, and are not subject to
taxation. It follows that counties are not responsible for determining the value of undeveloped or
undiscovered minerals and are not authorized or required tot~ valueless property. The Jensens
provide no support for their argument that counties are responsible for taxing valueless property,
and the Court is not aware of any. Valueless property cannot be taxed. Applying a tax rate to
property that has either no market value or an undetermined market value is pointless because the
resulting tax obligation would be zero. Valuable mineral interests whose fair market value can
be determined are required by statute and the Utah Constitution to be assessed by the Utah State
10

•

•

Tax Commission. Therefore, Uintah County did not have the authority to assess the severed
mineral estate in 1995, as the mineral estate at that time was not producing, the minerals were
undiscovered, and the value of the mineral estate was unknown.

III, Whether the statute of limitations bars any challenge to the MlY 2000 tax deed, despite no
notice given to the Jordans?
If the mineral estate was properly assessed by Uintah County, and a tax lien attached, the
next question is whether the Jordans' constitutional challenge based on lack of notice is barred by
the statute of limitations for tax deeds.
The Jensens argue that any challenge to their purchase of the mineral estate at the May
2000 tax sale is barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-206 bars
any challenges to tax title after four years from the date of the sale. Section 206 states:
an action or defense to recover, take possession of, quiet title to, or determine the
ownership of real property may not be commenced against the holder of a tax title
after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale, conveyance, or transfer of
the tax title to any county, or directly to any other purchaser at any public or private
sale. This section may not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal title
to the property which he or his predecessor actually occupied or possessed within
four years from the commencement of an action or defense ....
The Jensens have held the May 2000 tax title beyond the four-year period set forth in Section
206. There is no argument that the Jordans did not actually possess the mineral estate at any time
during the four-year time period between May 2000, and May 2004.3

3

The Court notes here the inequality the statute would create for owners of legal title to
unproductive mineral estates, as they would never be able to show actual possession of an
unproductive mineral estate. While it's not necessary to the outcome here, the Court finds that
the Jordans exercised as much actual possession or control of the mineral estate as possible, by
periodically leasing the minerals over the many years following the tax sale.
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The parties have offered extensive case law on this issue from a variety of jurisdictions.
The Court has reviewed the cases cited in the Motions and supplemental pleadings and found
them useful for gaining a general understanding of the law on this issue. Reliance on only two of
the cases is necessary and sufficient for this decision. In Jones v. Flowers, 541 U.S. 220 (2006),
the U.S. Supreme Court found that selling a person's property at a tax sale without notice was a
violation of the person's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Court determined that
notice of the tax sale must be reasonably calculated to reach the intended person to be deemed
constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 226; see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306,314 (1950). The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of application of the
tax title statute of limitations where the

tax sale included a procedural error. Frederiksen v.

LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981). In Frederiksen, the Court upheld the application of the
statute of limitations barring a challenge based on a procedural defect in the tax sale (the county
auditor's appointment was not made in writing, and had failed to take an oath of office, as
required by statute). The Court reasoned that the purpose of the statute of limitations was to
provide certainness and fmality to tax sales, even if the sale was invalid because of procedural
defects in the execution. Importantly for our purposes, however, is footnote 14 of the
Frederiksen opinion, in which Justice Oaks stated in dicta, "We expressly reserve opinion on
whether the special statute of limitations could protect a tax title acquired by means repugnant to
fundamental fairness or whether such an application of the statute would exceed the limits of
statutory intent or constitutional permissibility." Id. at 831, fn. 14.
Here, the Jordans were not given notice of the 1995 assessment or any assessment
thereafter. The Jordans were not listed on the assessment roll. Mr. Andrews was the only one
12
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given notice of the taxes levied after the severance. The general assessments made on the
Jordans' property prior to the 1995 severance never explicitly included an assessment for the
mineral estate. Neither the Jordans, nor their predecessors, were ever given notice of the May
2000 tax sale. Uintah County had the addresses for the Jordans and their attorney. The County
had previously sent tax notices for years prior to 199S to Olivia Jordan.
The Court finds that this is one particular instance that Justice Oaks alluded to where the
special statute of limitations does not apply. One of the most critical and fundamental due
process rights is the right to notice, particularly when notice pertains to a government seizure of
property. A statute of limitations that eliminates a person's right to challenge a tax sale, even
when notice was not given, runs afoul of Constitutional protections. The facts here are not
similar to those in Frediksen, where the error in the tax sale involved a minor procedural issue.
The error here was substantive and significant. Consequently the tax deed was not merely
voidable and subject to the statute of limitations, as the Jensens suggest. The tax deed is void
because the lack of notice to the Jordans is a jurisdictional defect of the sale. Without
jurisdiction, the statute of limitations did not start, let alone expire. Selling the Jordans' mineral
interest at a tax sale without notice was an unconstitutional taking and a violation of due process.
The Court finds that selling property at a county tax sale without any notice to the legal owner of
the property is repugnant to fundamental fairness.
Further, record notice does not absolved the Cowity of the problem. First, record notice
does not satisfy the requirements outlined in Jones v. Flowers. Second, the record notice showed
that the tax lien date was January 16, 1996, which all parties agree was a clerical error, but
nonetheless would not have given the Jordans accurate notice that their mineral interest may be
13
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in jeopardy of being sold. The County also admits that the Uintah County Assessor did not
assess the mineral rights in this case and did not believe he was required to do so. Therefore,
even if the Jordans had reviewed the record and inquired of the County concerning a potential
sale of their interest, the County would have affirmed that their property was not subject to the
tax sale. Finally, an actual inspection of the land during the time of the tax sale or four years
after would not have given the Jordans any indication that their mineral interest had been sold at

a tax sale. There was no development on the overlying surface property, nor was there any
physical evidence of production of the mineral interest.
Because there was no actual notice of the tax sale, record notice was insufficient and
inaccurate, and because there was no physical evidence to suggest to the Jordans that the property
might have been sold, the Court fmds that the sale was repugnant to fundamental fairness. The
sale, if intended to convey the severed mineral interests, was without due process of law, and
resulted in an unconstitutional talcing. Consequently, pursuant to Frederiksen footnote 14, the
statute of limitations does not apply to bar the Jordans' challenge to the tax sale.

IV, Whether the heirs of Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley have standing to assert the due

process claims?
Finally, the Jensens argue that the heirs of Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley lack
standing to assert the due process rights. Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley passed away in
2003 and 2002, respectively. Ms. Robertson's and Ms. Kelley's heirs are some of the Plaintiffs
claiming and interest in the property.
"[I]n Utah, as in the federal system, standing is ajurisdictional requirement." Brown v.
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Div. o/Water Rights of Dep't a/Natural Res., 2010 UT 14,112,228 P.3d 747. "As a general
rule, courts do not permit a party to assert the constitutional rights of a third party." Shelledy v.

Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 789 (Utah 1992). "[A] litigant must assert his own legal rights and interests,
and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Id.
However, "it has long been recognized that the surviving claims of a decedent must be
pursued by a third party." Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711 (1987). "[P]ennitting appellees to
raise their decedent's claims is merely an extension of the common law's provision for
appointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a 'settled practice of the courts' not
open to objection on the ground that it permits a litigant to raise third parties' rights." Id. at 712.
There are "two factors to be considered in determining when the third-party rule should
be suspended: the relationship of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert, and the
ability of the third party to assert his own right." Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, 118 (8th Cir.
1985). In Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp 2d 142, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), the court explained:
[m]oreover, as other courts have observed, the relationship between a parent and
child is much closer than those involved in other cases in which third-party standing
has been found to exist ... [t]he relationship between parent and child has been
deemed to be "more than sufficient to address the concerns that underlie the
prudential doctrine" of third-party standing. Elias v. United States Dep 't of State,
721 F. Supp. 243, 246-47 (N.D.Cal. 1989). Other courts have permitted a child to
assert his or her parent's equal protection rights in challenging the validity of statutes
that conferred United States citizenship on the foreign-born offspring of United
States citizen fathers, but not United States citizen mothers, see Wauchope v. United
States Dep 't ofState, 985 F.2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1993); Elisa, 721 F. Supp. at 24647, or which chilled the parent's right to adopt a child, see Lindley ex rel. Lindley v.
Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 129 (7 th Cir. 1989) ... Further, the effectiveness of a parent's
representation of his or her child is reflected in the well-established tradition that
permits parents to sue as the representatives of their minor children and to "maintain
litigation that rests directly on the standing of the children themselves." 13 Wright
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3531.9 (2d ed. 1984); see
also, e.g., Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 43 7, 441 (7 th Cir.
15
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Here, Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley are deceased and cannot pursue their constitutional
claims. As set forth above, they did not receive notice, and were not aware of their potential
constitutional claims before they died. Because they did not receive notice, they were not able to
pursue their constitutional claims before their deaths. The Plaintiffs, as heirs of Marie Robertson
and Caroline Kelley, also did not receive notice of the assessment, taxes, or sale.
As in Wauchope v. U.S. Dept. OfState, 156 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal. 1991), it is
"undisputed Plaintiffs' interests are harmonious with and at least as strong as the interest that
(their) mother would have asserted." The Plaintiffs, as children of Marie Robertson and Caroline
Kelley, have a sufficiently close relationship to satisfy the relationship factor in the third-party
standing test. The Court· finds that the Plaintiffs have third-party standing to assert the
constitutional claims.

Y, Whether Portions of Rolene Rasmussen's Affidavit should be Stricken?
In a separate motion, but in conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Jensens moved the court to strike certain portions ofRolene Rasmussen's testimony contained in
an affidavit. Jensens argue that the offending portions of the affidavit are legal conclusions not
based upon personal knowledge, rather than statements of fact. The particular paragraphs
complained of read as follows:
6. The Uintah County Assessor's office does not assess mineral rights. Mineral rights are
handled by the Utah State Tax Commission.
7. The mineral rights on the Property would not have been included in and would not
16
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have been part of the Uintah County assessment of the Property in 1995 or any years thereafter.
9. Mineral rights are not included in any appraisal of real property by the Uintah County
Appraiser's office since the mineral rights are not assessed by the county.
The Court finds that the statements can be read either as statements of fact or as legal
conclusions. The statement that the Uintah County Assessor's office does not assess mineral
rights can be taken as a statement of fact if Rasmussen has knowledge that the office makes no
attempt to value or assess mineral rights. Further, if Rasmussen knows that the office doesn't
separately assess mineral rights that have been severed from surface rights, such is a statement of
fact. Finally, if Rasmussen knows that appraisers in Uintah County don't attempt to value
minerals when performing appraisals for assessment purposes, such is a statement of fact. The
Court accepts Rasmussen's statement to establish these facts.
To the extent that Rasmussen's statement attempts to reach the ultimate legal conclusions
in this case, the Court disregards Rasmussen's statement for that purpose.

The Jordans' and Axia's Motions for Summary Judgment are granted. The Jensen's
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The Court quiets title to the mineral interest in the
Jordans. Pursuant to Code v. Utah Dept. ofHealth, 162 P.3d 1097 (Utah 2007), and Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(f)(2), the parties are notified that this is the final ruling and order in this case. The parties
need not prepare or submit any other order.

Dated this

(6

day of_~h-~----
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BY THE COURT:

s

EL P. CHIARA, District Court Judge
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James Harvey Jordan, Trustee
of the James H. Jordan
Revocable Trust dated June 1,
2007,
Martha Jordan Boright,
Mary Edna Jordan,
Michael C. Kelley and
Jary Anne Kelley, Trustees
of the Kelley Joint Trust
dated January 7, 2013,
Garey E. Kelley,
Norma Stroud Dickey,
Mara Beth Harner,
Jan Rhodes as Trustee of the
Revocable Rhodes Family
Living Trust dated April 19,
2005,
Wendy Sue Pack,
Craig Mcsorley,
Deborah J. Bowers,
Laura Ward,
Mark Mcsorley,

ORDER
(October 29, 2013 hearing)
r"
~

Plaintiffs,
Civil No.: 130800084
Judge: Edwin T. Peterson

vs.
Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi
Jensen,
Defendants.

The above captioned matter came before the Court on October
29,

2013 for argument on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss the

first Count Fifth

(Utah Code Ann.

Counter Claim and

the

Defendants'

§40-1-12)
Motion

in the Defendants

for

Leave

to

Amend

2
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Counterclaim and Request for Revised Notice of Event Due Dates
(the "Motion to Amend").
Plaintiffs
Allred.

were

Defendants

attorney Matthew E.

represented
were

present

Jensen.

by

their

and

attorney,

represented

by

Clark
their

Having read the relevant memoranda

and after hearing oral argument from counsel the court stated on
the record its reasoning and based thereon:
Orders as follows:
1.

The

Plaintiffs'

Motion

to

Dismiss

the

Fifth of the Counterclaim based on Utah Code Ann.

first

Count

§40-1-12 is

granted and that cause of action is dismissed.
2.

Based

on

stipulation

of

counsel

on

the

record,

the

only,

this

Motion to Amend is withdrawn.
3.

For

purposes

of

scheduling

and

discovery

matter will proceed as if a Tier 2 case under Rule 2 6 of the
Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

For

all

other

purposes,

including allowable damages, this case will be considered a Tier
3 case under Rules 8 and 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

If either party needs more discovery than is allowed

under tier II they can request the court for leave to conduct
additional discovery.
3
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DATED this

day of November, 2013.
BY THE COURT

Edwin T. Peterson
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:
/s/ Matthew E. Jensen
Signed by Clark Allred
with permission of
Matthew E. Jensen,
Attorney for Defendants
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MINES AND MINING
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owners in tbe proportion that the expenses of unit operations
ire charged, unless otherwise provided in the plan of unit
opemtion.
(12) This section shall apply only to field or pool units and
;hall not apply to the unitization of interests within a drilling
anit as may be authorized and governed under the provisions
ofSection 40-6-6.
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40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production - Payment of
proceeds - Requirements - Proceeding on
pe tition t o determine cause of nonpayment Remedies - Penalties.
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(l){a) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of
production from any well producing oil or gas in the state
shall be paid to any p'e rson legally entitled to the payment of
the proceeds not later than 180 days after the first day of the
month following the date of the first sale and thereafter not
later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month
within which payment is received by the payor for production, unless other periods or arrangements are provided for
in a valid contract with the person entitled to the proceeds.
(b) The payment shall be made directly to the person
entitled to the payment by the payor.
(c) The payment is considered to have been made upon
deposit in the United States mail.
(2) Payments shall be remitted to any person entitled to oil
and gas proceeds annually for the aggregate of up to 12
months accumulation of proceeds, if the total amount owed is
$100 or less.
(3)(a) Any delay in determining whether a person is legally
entitled to an interest in the oil and gas proceeds does not
affect payments to other persons entitled to payment.
1
(b) (i) If accrued payments cannot be made within the
time limits specified in Subsection (1) or (2), the payor
shall deposit all oil and gas proceeds credited to the
eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an escrow account
_
in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution
J1 using a standard escrow document form.
(ii) The deposit shall earn interest at the highest rate
a being offered by that institution for the amount and term
of similar demand deposits.
1
(iii) The escrow agent may commingle money received
into escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser, or
other person legally responsible for payment.
(iv) Payment of principal and accrued interest from
the escrow account shall be made by the escrow agent to
the person legally entitled to them within 30 days from
the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal
deternunation of entitlement to the payment.
(v) Applicable escrow fees shall be deducted from the
payments.
(4) Any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds may file a
petition with the board to conduct a hearing to determine why
the proceeds have not been paid.
(5) Upon receipt of the petition, the board shall set the
matter for investigation and negotiation by the division within
60 days.
(6)(a) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of
that date, the board may set a hearing within 30 days.
(b) If the board does not set a hearing, ru1y information
gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be
given to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in a
court of competent jurisdiction.
(7)(a) If, after a hearing, the board finds the proceeds have
not been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in
accordance with Subsection (3), the board may order that;
{i) a complete accounting be made; and
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(ii) the proceeds be subject to an interest rate of
1-1/2% per month, as a substitute for an escrow account
interest rate, accruing from the date the payment should
have been suspended in accordance with Subsection (3).
(b) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of
payment is ,vithout reasonable justification, the board may;
(i} if the proceeds have been deposited in an interest
beru-ing escrow account in accordance ,vith Subsection (3):
(A) order a complete accounting;
(B) require the proceeds and accruing interest to
remain in the escrow account; and
(C) assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total proceeds
and interest in the escrow account; or
(ii) if the proceeds have not been deposited in an
interest bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3), assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total
proceeds and interest as determined under Subsection
(7)(a).
(c) (i) Upon finding that the delay of payment is without
reasonable justification, the board shall set a date not
later than 90 days from the hearing for final distribution
of the total sum.
(ii) If payment is not made by the required date, the
total proceeds, interest, and any penalty as provided in
Subsection (7)(b) shall be subject to interest at a rate of
1-1/2% per month until paid.
(d) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of
payment is with reasonable justification and the proceeds·
have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account
in accordance with Subsection (3), the payor may not be
required to make an accounting or payment of appropriately
suspended proceeds until the condition which justified suspension has been satisfied.
(8) The circumstances under which the board may find the
suspension of payment of proceeds is made with reasonable
justification, such that the penalty provisions of Subsections
(7)(b) and (7)(c)(ii) do not apply, include, but are not limited to,
the following:
(a) the payor:
(i) fails to make the payment in good faith reliance
upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah attorney objecting
to the lack of good and marketable title of record of the
person claiming entitlement to payment; and
(ii) furnishes a copy of the relevant portions of the
opinion to the person for necessary curative action;
(b) the payor receives information which:
(i) in the payor's good faith judgment, brings into
question the entitlement of the person claiming the right
to the payment to receive that payment;
(ii) has rendered the title unmarketable; or
(iii) may expose the payor to the risk of liability to
third parties if the payment is made;
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession
of the payor owed to the person making claim to payment is
less than $100 at the end of any month; or
(d) the person entitled to payment has failed or refused to
execute a division or transfer order acknowledging the
proper interest to which the person claims to be entitled and
setting forth the mailing address to which payment may be
directed, provided the division or transfer order does not
alter or amend the terms of the lease.
(9) If the circumstances described in Subsection (S)(a) or (b)
arise, the payor may:
(a) suspend and escrow the payments in accordance with
Subsection (3); or
(b) at the request and expense of the person claiming
entitlement to the payment, make the payment into court
on an interpleader action to resolve the claim and avoid
liability under this chapter.
2010
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paid in a timely ma nner.
(3) The affidavit, or a certified copy, shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts stated in the affidavit.
(4) The amendments made in this section do not affect any
act or right accruing or which has accrued or been esta blished
or any suit or proceeding commenced before May 1, 1995. 1990
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MINES AND MINING
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40-1-7. District 1·ecorders - Office abolished.
From and after the terminat ion of the office of any mining
district recorder now holding office in this state such district
shall be abolished and such office shall become vacant. 1033
40-1-8. Vacancy and removal - County recorder to
receive records.
(1) If there is a vacancy in the office of recorder of any
mining district, or if t here is no person in the mining district
a uthorized to retain t he custody and give certified copies of the
records, the person having custody of the records shall deposit
them in the office of the county recorder of the county in which
the mining district, or the greater part of the mining district,
is situated .
(2) That county recorde r shall take possession of the records and may ma ke and certify copies from the records,
including a ny other copies of records and papers in the
recorder's office pertaining to mining claims.
(3) Those certified copies sha ll be receivable in evidence in
all cou'r ts and before all officers and t ribuna ls .
(4) The production of a certified copy shall be, without
furthe r proof, evidence that the records were properly in t he
custody of the county recorder.
1990
40-1 -9. Coun ty recorder may certify district records.
(1) When the books, records, and documents pertaining to
the office of mining district recorder have been deposited in
the office of a county recorder, t he recorder may make and
certify copies from those records.
(2) Those certified copies shall be receivable in all tribunals
and before all officers of this state in the same manner and to
the same effect as if the records had been originally filed or
made in the office of the county recorder.
1909
40-1-10. Certified copies of records evidence.
Copies of notices of location of mining claims, mill sites and
t unnel sites heretofore recorded in the records of the several
mining districts, a nd copies of the mining rules and regulat ions in force therein and recorded, when duly certified by the
district or county recorder, shall be receivable in a ll tribunals
and before a ll officers of this state as prima facie evidence.
1033

40-1-11. Interfe ring with notices, stakes, or monuments
- Penalty.
Any person who intentionally or knowingly tears· down or
defaces a notice posted on a mining claim, or takes up or
destroys any stake or monument ma rking the claim, or
interferes with any person lawfully in possession of the clajm,
or who alters, erases, defaces, or destroys any record kept by
a mining district or county recorder, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not less than
$25 nor more than $100, or by imprisonment for not less than
10 days nor more than six months , or by both the fine and
imprisonment.
2001
40-1 -12. Damages for wrongful removal of ores.
When da mages are claimed for the extraction or selling of
ore from any mine or mining claim and the defendant, or those
under whom he claims, holds, under color of title adverse to
the claims of the plaintiff, in good faith, then the reasonable
value of all labor bestowed or expenses incurred in necessary
developing, mining, transporting, concentrating, selling or

preparing said ore, or its mineral content, for market, must be
a llowed as an offset against s uch damages; provided, however,
that any person who, wrongfully entering upon an y mine or
mining claim a nd carrying away ores therefrom, or wrongfully
extracting and selling ores from any mine, having knowledge
of the existence of adverse claimants in any mine or mining
claim , and without notice to t hem, knowingly and willfully
trespasses in or upon such mine or mining claim and extracts
or sells ore the refrom shall be liable to the owners of s uch ore
for three times the value thereof without any deductions
either for labor bestowed or expenses incurred jn removing,
transporting, selling or preparing said ore, or its mineral
content for market.
1943
40-1-13. R e peale d.
CHAPTER2
COAL MINE SAFETY ACT

Section
40-2-1 to 40-2-17. Repealed/Renumbered.
Part 1
General Provisions

40-2-101.
40-2-102.
40-2-103.
40-2-104.

Title.
Definitions.
Scope and administration of chapter.
Rulema king a uthority.
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Utah Office of Coal Mine Safety

40-2-201.
40-2-202.
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40-2-204.
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Utah Office of Coal Mine Safety created.
Appointment of director.
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Necessity of certificate.
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40-2-1 to 40-2-17. Repealed/Renumbered.
PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
40-2-101. Title .
This chapter is known as the "Coal Mjne Safety Act."
40-2-102. Definitions.
As used in t his chapter:
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